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ABSTRACT. Of the theoretical resources typically taken as the underlying 
foundations of critical social psychology, elements, typically, each of Marxism, 
feminism, psychoanalysis, and Post-Structuralism, one particular mode of 
critique remains notably absent: postcolonial theory. What might be the most 
crucial contributions that postcolonial critique can make to the project of critical 
psychology? One answer is that of a reciprocal forms of critique, the retrieval of 
a ‘psychopolitics’ in which we not only place the psychological within the 
register of the political, but - perhaps more challengingly - in which the political 
is also, strategically, approached through the register of the psychological. What 
the writings of Fanon and Biko make plain in this connection is the degree to 
which the narratives and concepts of the social psychological may be 
reformulated so as to fashion a novel discourse of resistance, one that opens up 
new avenues for critique for critical psychology, on one hand, and that affords 
an innovative set of opportunities for the psychological investigation of the 
vicissitudes of the postcolonial, on the other. 
 
Keywords: postcolonial, psychopolitics, critical psychology, political, Fanon, 
Biko, Bhabha, psychoanalysis, resistance, racism 
 
The most powerful weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed  
Steve Biko. 
 
Of the theoretical resources typically taken as the underlying foundations of critical 
social psychology, elements, typically, each of Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, 
and, perhaps chiefly, the 'turn to text' characteristic of Post-Structuralism (Gough & 
McFadden, 2001; Hepburn, 2003; Parker, 1999, 2002; Walkerdine, 2002), one 
particular mode of critique remains notably absent, that of postcolonial theory. What 
makes this omission so conspicuous is that much postcolonial theory is explicitly 
psychological in both its concerns and its critical resources. Fanon's (1986) Black Skin 
White Masks, for example, makes ample reference to various psychological and 
psychoanalytic formulations as way of accentuating what one might term the 'identity 
trauma' of blackness in colonial contexts, and as way of articulating the depth and 
tenacity of the psychical components of racism (Bulhan, 1985). Homi Bhabha (1983) 
likewise cross-references a series of psychoanalytic notions – chiefly that of the fetish, 
but also the condensation and displacement of the dreamwork, and the narcissistic 
aggressivity of the mirror-stage ego-formation – in his reformulation of that classic 
social psychological notion of the stereotype. While the conceptual framework of 
psychoanalysis is absent in the writings of Steve Biko (1978), his political objectives 
are powerfully, even if strategically psychological in nature. It is by drawing upon the 
terms of this discourse of self, identity, subjectivity that certain of the key features of 
the Black Consciousness Movement come to light. In many ways Black 
Consciousness takes as its goal exactly the consolidation of positive and politicized 
forms of black culture and identity, certainly inasmuch as they play their role in 
generating political solidarity amongst the oppressed.  
 Each of these above sets of critical formulations provide powerful ways of 
thinking the conjunction of the psychological and the political, the affective and the 
structural, the psychical and the governmental. We have as such a powerfully critical 
combination of registers that one would take to lie at the centre of critical 
psychology’s ostensibly critical concerns (Hayes, 1989; Hook, 2004a). Why then 
have such post- or anti-colonial thinkers 1 not featured more strongly in the 
conceptual resources of critical social psychology? How might their work, and their 
characteristic concerns – racism, colonial discourse, cultural dispossession, alterity, 
psychical mutilation, resistance, etc. - alert us to gaps in the growing orthodoxy of 
critical psychology? To approach the question from another direction: what might be 
said to be the ‘critical psychology’ of these theorists, and particularly of Frantz Fanon 
and Steve Biko? How might their use of the register of the psychological within the 
political and their concerns with the cultural dynamics of colonisation alert us to the 
possibilities of psychology as a vocabulary of resistance? Furthermore, what does 
each of these critics have to tell us about the crowning problematic of the colonial and 
postcolonial condition, namely that of racism, a phenomena that seems as political as 
it does psychical in nature? Before turning to a brief discussion of the work of each of 
the above theorists it will be necessary to underline what I mean when I refer both to 
‘critical social psychology’ and ‘postcolonial criticism’. 
 
 
Critical social psychology and political critique 
 
There have been a series of attempted definitions of critical social psychology of late. 
Gough & McFadden (2001), for example, have put forward an understanding of a 
critical social psychology that ‘challenges social institutions and practices – including 
the discipline of psychology – that contribute to forms of inequality and oppression’ 
(p. 2). This is a version of social psychology, they suggest, in which practitioners 
situate themselves within society and its problems, a social psychology which ‘gets 
involved, which adopts particular positions in important debates on…issues such as 
prejudice, violence…crime, etc’ (p. 2). Valerie Walkerdine (2002) has similarly 
suggested a move away from the academy to politics, an understanding of a critical 
psychology that expresses a pronounced commitment to the theories of post-
structuralism, and that stresses the importance ‘not of psychology per se, but…of the 
subject and conceptions of subjectivity for politics’ (p. 1). Critical psychology she 
claims is hence ‘an umbrella term which describes a number of politically radical 
responses to and differences from mainstream psychology…[including] perspectives 
of…feminism, ethnic and anti-racist politics’ (Walkerdine, 2002, p. 2). Tellingly 
however, Walkerdine (2002) comments on how the political commitment which has 
generated such anti-racist, feminist, gay liberation changes seems largely ‘to have has 
been lost’ (p. 2)  
 Hepburn (2003) thinks of critical social psychology as focussed on issues of 
politics, morality and social change, and as being predominantly concerned with 
issues of oppression, exploitation and human well-being. Critical social psychology 
though is also ‘critical of psychology itself…its assumptions, its practices’ (p. 1). 
However, she notes (2003), this dual task of criticizing society and criticizing the 
discipline sometimes leads to these two factors working against one another. Turning 
to Parker (2002), we may understand critical psychology as the systematic 
examination of how dominant accounts of psychology operate ideologically, and in 
the services of power. Importantly though, this ‘heterogeneous process of critique’ 
should ideally spread to forms of social action (Goodley & Parker, 2000). A tension 
again seems apparent here between intellectual undertakings against psychology, and 
the broader sphere of political activism, as I have noted elsewhere (Hook, 2001).  
 If we are to assess critical psychology in terms of the above definitions, we 
may well arrive at the conclusion that its agendas of political activity remain of a 
particularly limited sort, particularly in so far as they remain focussed on the critique 
of psychology itself. Work falling under the rubric of ‘critical psychology’ may of 
course exceed the above definitions, and hence we would be at fault to making 
sweeping claims regards the shortcomings of critical psychology as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the question poses itself as to whether it might not be worthwhile 
offering a slightly different description of, or focus for, critical psychology than those 
given above. May we not, by contrast, suggest that critical psychology should 
constitute an investigation of the relation between power and psychology, that it 
should be concerned both with the critique of oppressive use of psychology and with 
enabling potentially transformative forms of practice (from within psychology, or 
from without) which disrupt imbalances of power and which have social equality as 
their goal (Hook, 2004a)? 
 To be clear then, the critique that I will go on to offer does not take critical 
psychology as a whole as a target, rather it focuses on a set of depoliticizing 
tendencies within critical psychology best outlined by Hayes (2001).  Critical 
psychology, he argues, needs reconsider what it means to be critical, that it need 
focus on what prospective critical historical antecedents it might best align itself so as 
to overcome this gap between intellectual and political activity, between insular 
critical engagements with psychology itself, and the broader realm of social action. 
This search for strategic theoretical forms, he claims, needs be lead by a suspicion of 
the neutralizing trappings neo-liberalism (Hayes, 2001). In his words: 
 
[C]ritical psychology needs to engage with and develop concepts that have the potential 
to transcend merely abstract...analysis, and point the way to practical...political 
engagement... [C]ritical psychology would be...incomplete if it did not try to take on 





Having identified an area of concern within the general domain of critical psychology, 
we should now turn our attention to introducing the ‘postcolonial’. In this connection, 
we may turn to Homi Bhabha who provides an adroit summary of both the concerns 
and the scope of postcolonial criticism. (Although I will not discuss Bhabha’s work in 
any detail here, he usefully enables us to frame the discussion of the writings of Fanon 
and Biko, and to emphasize at certain points, trenchant points of my overall 
argument). Postcolonial criticism, he writes ‘bears witness to the unequal and uneven 
forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social 
authority within the modern world’ (1994, p. 171).  
 
Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial testimony of Third World countries 
and the discourses of ‘minorities’ within the geopolitical divisions of East and West, 
North and South…[Their aim is to] intervene in those ideological discourses of 
modernity that attempt to give a hegemonic ‘normality’ to the uneven development and 
the differential, often disadvantaged, histories of nations, races, communities, peoples. 
They formulate their critical revisions around issues of cultural difference, social 
authority, and political discrimination in order to reveal the antagonistic and ambivalent 
moments within the ‘rationalizations’ of modernity…the postcolonial project, at the 
most general theoretical level, seeks to explore those social pathologies ‘loss of 
meaning, conditions of anomie’ – that no longer simply ‘cluster around class 
antagonism, [but] break up into widely scattered historical contingencies’. (Bhabha, 
1994, p. 171) 
 
Bhabha adds two further vital points to this commentary. Firstly: ‘it is from those who 
have suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, 
displacement – that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking…’ 
(1994, p. 172). Furthermore:  
 
[T]he affective experience of social marginality – as it emerges in non-canonical 
cultural forms - transforms of critical strategies. It forces us to…engage with culture as 
an uneven, incomplete production of meaning and value, often composed of 
incommensurable demands and practices, produced in the act of social survival. 
(Bhabha, 1994, p. 172) 
 
With these points in mind - the revitalization of critique by those who have suffered 
the subjugation of colonialism, and culture as a tactic of ‘social survival’ - we turn our 
attentions to Frantz Fanon and to those aspects of his more psychological writings that 





One way of grasping the importance of the inaugural moment of Fanon’s critique in 
Black Skin, White Masks is by understanding that what Fanon was doing was to 
formulate a kind of critique where, to a very large extent, one did not properly exist, 
and where no pre-existing forms would do.2 If there is a fact that Fanon’s most vital 
writings impress upon us, it is that the violence of the colonial encounter is absolutely 
unprecedented, that the colonial moment of epistemic, cultural, psychic and physical 
violence makes for a unique kind of historical trauma. Bhabha (1987) puts this well 
when he suggests that the force of Fanon’s vision comes from the tradition of the 
oppressed, the language of revolutionary awareness, adding, furthermore, that ‘there 
is no master narrative or realist perspective that provides a background of social and 
historical facts against which emerge the problems of the individual or collective 
psyche [in the colonial encounter]’ (1986, p. ii). Bhabha here is expanding on Fanon, 
who himself is drawing on Mannoni (1990) – although in changed form: despite what 
Fanon gains from him, Mannoni is an early target of Black Skin, White Masks - who 
initially made the suggestion that the colonial world seems not only pathological, but 
pathogenic by the severity of the relations of domination that it incurred, by its 
function as a surface of fantasy, ambivalence, hatred and desire. The argument as such 
is that something like a psychological, and indeed psychoanalytic register, is 
indispensable both in properly formulating these violence – grasping them 
conceptually, analytically - and as a rudimentary basis for their critique. Fanon opens 
Black Skin, White Masks by insisting on the necessity of a psychoanalytic account of 
racism and colonial violence, even if such a conceptualization need ultimately take its 
place alongside, and in conjunction with, analyses of the socio-political and economic 
factors. 
 Perhaps Fanon’s greatest source of originality as a theorist, as McCulloch 
(1983) has argued, is to be found in his combination of psychology and politics, his 
attempts, for example, to approach the problems of national liberation and social 
revolution from the perspective of psychopathology, and the problems of personal 
identity through a sustained focus on the violence of the colonial encounter. 
McCulloch:  
 
All of Fanon’s work falls into that category where the sciences of personality and the 
sciences of society converge…[in an attempt] to traverse the distance between an 
analysis of the consciousness of the individual and the analysis of social institutions. 
(1983, pp. 206-207) 
 
Labeau (1998) has recently discussed Fanon’s work in view of the notion of a 
‘psychopolitics’ which I understand, building on McCulloch’s conceptualization, as a 
kind of to and fro movement of registers, of the political into the psychological, and, 
just as importantly, of the psychological into the political. (Or, as frequently in Fanon, 
the ‘to and fro’ of questions of racialized power and how they might be 
psychoanalytically formulated). In this vein we might think the project of 
psychopolitics as the critical movement between the socio-political and the 
psychological, each of which becomes a means of critiquing the other. We have then 
an explicit means of the politicization of the psychological. This idea provides us with 
a useful frame to think the ‘critical psychology’ of Fanon, Biko and Bhabha. Indeed, 
such a politicization can take at least three related forms. It may refer to the critical 
process whereby we place a series of ostensibly psychological concerns and concepts 
within the register of the political and thereby show up the extent to which human 
psychology is intimately linked to, and in some ways conditioned or limited by, the 
socio-political and historical forces of its situation. Fanon’s work is certainly 
emblematic of this trend; his refutation of Mannoni’s orthodox psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the dreams of colonized Malagasy subjects is a case in point. (In one 
particularly memorable instance he remarks ‘The rifle [in the dream of a Malagasy 
man] is not a penis but a genuine rifle, model Lebel 1916’ (1986, p. 106)).  
Likewise, such a politicization may refer to the critical process whereby 
psychological concepts, explanations and even modes of experience are employed to 
describe and illustrate the workings of power. Fanon’s work again makes for a 
benchmark here, although Bhabha’s work perhaps extends this mandate, intent as it is 
on detailing, with reference to a psychoanalytic vocabulary, something like the 
vicissitudes of colonial power and its resistances. The critical hope here is that by 
being able to analyze the political in such a psychological way, one might be able to 
think strategically about how best to intervene within the life of power. Extending this 
idea, (thirdly) one might suggest that we can put certain forms of psychology to actual 
political work, that we can use both the concepts and understandings of psychology, 
and the actual terms of psychological experience, as a means of consolidating 
resistances to power. This, in many ways, is Biko’s (1978) strategy: the conditional 
use of certain psychological concepts as a basis for solidarity and resistance to power. 
 Returning our focus to Fanon: by examining the debilitating personality and 
identity effects of trying to understand oneself, as a black subject within the system of 
values of white or European culture – the phenomena of a ‘white mask psychology’ 
such as socially-induced ‘inferiority complexes’, practices of ‘lactification’, the 
neurotic compulsion to be white, etc. - Fanon shows how that what might otherwise 
be understood within a purely psychological framework is far better explained in 
political terms, that is, with reference to understandings of racialized power, colonial 
violence and cultural subordination. In this respect one witnesses in Fanon an 
astonishing blend of theoretical figures, a kind of lateral movement across 
psychoanalytic, Marxist, existential, psychiatric and literary modes of 
conceptualization, all put to use as means of expressing, with difficulty and 
formidable theoretical complexity, something of the identity-violence of colonial 
dispossession. The key problematic that Fanon is concerned with here – echoing in 
many ways the notion of ‘double consciousness’ as articulated in both earlier and later 
theorists of racism (I mean here Du Bois (1989) and Gilroy (1994) respectively) - is 
that of being the subject of cultural oppression/racism in which one is incessantly fed 
with cultural values and understandings which are hostile, devaluating of myself and 
my culture.  
The colonized subject (or, in Fanon’s terms, the native)  hence exists in what 
Sartre (1990) referred to in the preface to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth as the state 
of a ‘nervous condition’, an anxious and agitated state (speaking both politically and 
psychologically) in which one possess little or no cultural resources of one’s own, 
because they have been eradicated by the cultural imperialism of the colonizer. 
Fanon’s attempt is to impart to his readers a sense of what this might mean, an 
awareness not only of the affects of the continual dissonance, within the colonized 
subject, between ego and culture, self and society, but also the inevitability of coming 
to think and act subjectively as white, of experiencing oneself as a ‘phobic object’, 
and thus of hate coming both from without and from within, as Lebeau (1998) puts it. 
This is a lesson very much at the basis of postcolonial critique, a continual awareness 
of the dislocation between the ideals, the norms of the valorised Western culture, and 
those of the dominated culture, which comes to be the demoted other of all of these 
values. This constant and recurring slippage is properly pathogenic for Fanon, at least 
in the sense that it causes a deeply-rooted sense of inferiority, a constantly 
problematized sense of identity which is split and at war with itself, causing 
‘pathologies of liberty’ as Fanon (1990) calls them. 3 
Perhaps the key passage of Fanon’s ‘psychopolitics’ is the famous encounter 
with the white child on a train that ‘materializes’ psychological objectification into a 
far more corporeal kind of violence. The racial objectification Fanon suffers at the 
hands of the white child (‘“Look, a Negro!”…“Mama, see the Negro! I’m 
frightened!” Frightened! Frightened!’ (1986, p. 112)), is that of a crushing objecthood 
beneath the white gaze which dissipates his subjectivity, along with his ability to 
represent himself. Fanon describes it as an ‘amputation, an excision, a haemorrhage 
that splatter[s] my body with black blood’ (1986, p. 112). This metaphoric conversion 
of psychic assault into the terms of bodily brutality makes apparent the violence - 
indeed the trauma - of seemingly minor (and non-physical) incidents of colonial 
racism. More to the point perhaps, it speaks of a materialist psychology, by which I 
mean to suggest that it unconventionally links the domain of psychological action to a 
world of concrete and material effects. This is a point of some importance, so I should 
be as clear as possible: this materialist psychology appears to disobey the disciplinary 
injunction to focus on the sphere of pure psychology alone. In so doing, it calls 
attention to how purist forms of psychology abstract pressing political contexts out of 
consideration or analysis. Material, institutional and indeed physical relations of force 
that in fact condition and underwrite psychological existence in colonial environments 
are often as a result ruled out of analytic contention. 4 
A similar example of how certain psychological effects are put into a relation 
with the material world, of how the psychic mutilations of colonialism cannot simply 
be ‘psychologized away’, or made reducible to an ‘apolitical’ frame of analysis, 
comes from Aimé Césaire (1972) who speaks of colonialism in the following terms: ‘I 
am talking of millions of men who have been skilfully infected with fear, inferiority 
complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, debasement’ (cited in Fanon, 1986, p. 14). 
Fanon’s linking of psychology and politics is at its most forceful here, in his 
understanding of colonialism as not only a means of appropriating land and territory, 
but of appropriating culture and history themselves, that is, as a way of appropriating 
the means and resources of identity, and hence affecting powerful forms psychic 
distress and damage. The colonization of a land, its people, its culture, is also, in short, 
is a ‘colonizing of the mind’, in Ngugi wa Thing’o’s (1986) famous phrase. In similar 
terms, Bulhan (1979, 1985) argues, rearticulating Fanon: ‘the uprooting of psyches 
from their culture to their insertion into another, in which the basic values [are] 
prowhite and antiblack, elicit[s] a victimization difficult to quantify, but very 
massive’ (Bulhan, 1985, p. 189).   
 
 
The psychological analysis of racism 
 
Not only does Fanon bring politics into psychology, he also, manages the reverse, of 
bringing psychology into politics. He does this by analyzing racism through a series 
of psychoanalytic conceptualizations that usefully dramatize the logic and workings 
of colonial power. We find reference in Black Skin, White Masks to a succession of 
psychoanalytic theorists, Freud, Jung, Adler, Lacan, Mannoni are each utilized, even 
if certain of these (Jung and Mannoni) are reviled in the process. A rich 
psychoanalytic vocabulary of concepts emerges: the ‘neurosis of blackness’ or dream 
of turning white (‘What does the black man want?…The black man wants to be 
white’ (1986, pp. 8-9)), the racial imago, the mirror-stage as drama of racial 
difference, the idea of a ‘European collective unconscious’, the conceptualization of 
the Negro as phobogenic object, whiteness as ‘metaphysics of positivity’, not to 
mention the mechanisms of projection, ambivalence and scapegoating, each viewed as 
component procedures of racist ideation. The objectives of this psychological 
conceptualization is to subject the ‘vicissitudes of racism’ to critique, to investigate 
their procedures, in the hope that one might interrupt its functioning. One might view 
this as Fanon’s analysis of the psychic life of the colonial encounter. Because of 
limitations of space I will not discuss this vital element of Fanon’s work in more 
detail here, although I have done so elsewhere (Hook, 2004b) (see also McCulloch 
1983; Gibson, 2003). 
Fanon also considers how we might explore psychological concepts as 
conceptual instruments of a progressive politics. Indeed, Fanon had intended Black 
Skin, White Masks to serve as a kind of ‘instrument of liberation’ (Macey, 2000); the 
original intended title of the book was ‘Essay for the dis-alienation of the black man’ 
(Julien, 1995). Many of the book’s chief ideas - the sociogenetic approach to 
psychopathology, the conviction of madness as organically linked to the situation of 
repression, as just two examples - are orientated exactly toward making change 
possible. As psychoanalysis hopes to free the neurotic from his or her personal 
neurosis, so this text was intended, as Adams (1970) emphasizes, to offer the reader a 
means of alleviating forms of racial neurosis. Here of course one should not neglect 
the practical elements of Fanon’s own clinical practice, his attempts at transforming 
conditions of psychiatric internment (well detailed by Bulhan, 1980a, 1999; Caute, 
1970; McCulloch, 1983). The psychological dimension of political existence must as 
such be addressed, it must take its place alongside economic and social, indeed 
revolutionary struggles, and must do so as a matter of urgency (Bulhan, 1985). Before 
one can create the conditions for solidarity among the oppressed, intimates Fanon 
(1968) – anticipating the standpoint of Steve Biko and Black Consciousness to follow 
- there must first be the destruction of the subjective aspect of black oppression. 
This is the particular complexity of Fanon’s psychopolitics: an awareness that 
psychology does feature in politics, and that we cannot reduce psychology away – 
reified and ideologically-skewed as many of its primary concepts may well be – or 
allow it to fall out of the conceptual vocabulary of critical psychology. Those forms of 
critical psychology content to critique the discourse and functioning of psychology 
from afar, abstaining themselves from the psychological, as it were, seem to manage 
only half of Fanon’s call for critique. It is not enough, to reiterate, to conceptualize 
how politics impacts psychology; we need an awareness also of the psychological 
working of power, of how subjectivity repeats, reiterates, reinforces the political. 
After all, these two categories are inseparably joined: just as it is not good enough to 
engage psychology without a consideration of power, so it is insufficient to engage 
certain forms of power, like that of racism, without a consideration of its ‘conditions 
of subjectivity’. And indeed, the case of racism is instrumental here. As Fanon makes 
quite clear, to adopt a psychological/psychoanalytic engagement with racism is not 
necessarily to imply that the denigratory imaging of blackness – to take one example 
that he (1986) uses - is in any way a natural, ahistorical, predisposed quality of 
cerebral matter, as it seems is the implication of Jungian psychoanalysis. To adopt a 
psychological engagement with racism is though to assert the regularity, the 
deployable frequency of such depictions; it is to assert that racist images of this sort 
feature strongly in the psychical phenomena of the minds of racist/colonial societies. 
Fanon’s point is that such images circulate widely, indeed penetratively, across the 
affective and psychic channels of society, propping up the contents of individual 
dreams, phobias, symptoms, neuroses of colonizer and colonized alike, taking root at 
the micro-political level of individual psychology, although without being simply 
reducible to this psychic level of realization.  
It remains imperative as such to understand how psychic structure, how details 
of individual psychology and psychical mechanisms may recapitulate political 
structure, to acknowledge that neither political nor psychical structure on its own 
makes for a sufficient basis of analysis. This, admittedly, is a point of critique that 
holds better for certain trends within critical psychology than for others. I have in 
mind here particularly those trends of analysis that focus more on grappling with the 
ideological impact of psychology as itself a powerful discourse than with exploring 
the substantive psychological, affective or psychical underpinnings of a political 
phenomena like that of racism. In certain instances this is with good cause, the cause 
being wariness towards the ideological bent of much psychological language, a 
reticence towards slipping into the apparent individualism, reductionism and de-
politicization it so typically entails. A number of important texts from within the 
ambit of critical psychology share this characteristic, typically those which centralize 
the role of post-structural theory, or, much by the same token, that adopt a 
predominantly social constructionist orientation towards analysis (see for example 
volumes edited by Gergen & Grauffman, 1996; Levett, Kottler, Burman & Parker, 
1997; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999; Parker & Shotter, 1990; Shotter & Gergen, 
1989). Also emblematic of this trend are Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gergen, 1999, 
2001; Harre & Stearns, 1995; Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell 
Smith, 1995). 
This is not always the case though; the work of Frosh (1989, 2002a) makes for 
a strong counterpoint here. While firm that a socio-political and often discursive 
account of racism is necessary - and that a psychological account should by no means 
act as a substitute for such a level of engagement - he nonetheless insists that both 
such forms of analysis are vital. We need an approach that is able to properly engage 
the affective and psychological components of the political phenomenon of racism. 
We need explain how such phenomena ‘become…an integral part of the emotional 
life of the racist individual…the emotional and ideological intensity with which 
[racist] group identity [is] constructed’ (Frosh, 1989, p. 215). (In this connection see 
also Frosh, 2001, 2002b, 2002c; Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2002).  
None of this is of course to suggest that the discipline of psychology has 
provided us with a set of trustworthy instruments; historically it most certainly has 
not. (For discussion of the role of psychology in the perpetuation of racism (as a case 
in point), see Foster, 1991, 1993; on the topic of psychological instrumentation and 
power, see Rose, 1991, 1996). As such it is necessary to maintain a certain distance 
and critical mistrust toward many of the conceptual tools that the discipline at our 
disposal. However, in so far as the over-arching critical agenda remains that of 
analyzing and disrupting the functioning of power, psychological forms of analysis 
and critique remain crucial. It is useful here to refer to Foster (1991), who argues that 
‘Psychology as a product of modernity has in the main been a productive servant in 
the reproduction of major forms of inequality and oppression – patriarchy, racism, 
class domination’ (p. 347). Nevertheless, whilst scathing towards the ‘postivistic, 
individualistic, politically conservative roots’ of psychology (p. 347) he nonetheless 
holds out hope for the emancipatory potential of the discipline, presenting it, at least 
in part, as a resource of liberation (Foster, 2004) (as do Lykes, Banuazizi, Liem & 
Morris, 1996 and Martin-Baro, 1994). 
I should be clear here: textual or discursive models of analysis have made vital 
and often innovative contributions to the critique and understanding of racism, as a 
series of recent studies drawn from the South African context demonstrates (Dixon & 
Durrheim, 2000; Dixon & Reicher, 1997; Dixon, Reicher & Foster, 1997; Durrheim, 
1997; Durrheim and Dixon, 2001). Indeed, discursive or social constructionist modes 
of analysis have certainly provided us with a ‘replacement vocabulary’, alternative 
modes of conceptualization through which aspects of racist behavior may be 
formulated beyond the constraints of purely psychological terms of reference. This, in 
many ways, is a benefit. The question remains however whether a crucial 
psychological component is neglected by such accounts, and whether, as a result, their 
explanatory efficacy suffers. Let me give an example that continues the above 
concern with racism. The above approaches to racism all leave unexamined the 
psychical question of desire. Now, for both Fanon (1986) and Bhabha (1994), such an 
omission must undermine the efficacy of the critique of racism in question. No 
analysis of (post)-colonial racism can, for these theorists, be sufficient unless it 
involves consideration of issues of fantasy, sexuality, ambivalence and desire, each of 
which is taken as an integral part of the radical asymmetries of power and privilege, 
which characterize such contexts. This is not to say that psychoanalysis is being 
positioned as the privileged mode of explanation, nor is to demand a dogmatic loyalty 
to its discourse; both theorists evoke a hybrid bricolage of concepts and explanatory 
vehicles in their approach to racism. It is though to suggest that there is something 
indispensable about a psychological/psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding 
of racism. Bhabha (1986) addresses a similar point when he refers to the failure of the 
standard array of critical systems (narratives that is, of economic necessity, historical 
progress, critical humanism) regards understanding the politics of race. The psychical 
affectivity of racism, in his (1986) estimation, elides all such attempts at explanation.  
There is an important point of contextualization to be added here: Bhabha is 
not antagonistic towards post-structural or discursive modes of analysis; he views 
these as necessary compliments to his particular brand of psychoanalytic theorizing. 
Bhabha views himself as extending those attempts, like that of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978), to understand formations of colonial knowledge and/or racism in 
predominantly discursive terms. Indeed, the latter text provides the initial co-ordinates 
for Bhabha’s own project of postcolonial critique; the challenge of conceptualizing 
the structure and functioning of colonial discourse remains an imperative across his 
work. However, the knowledge and power of colonial discourse, like the functional 
utility of racism - and this is the vital point - cannot for Bhabha (1994), be resolved in 
purely epistemological terms. Part of the resulting corrective that Bhabha aims to 
deliver to Said, as Moore-Gilbert (1997) notes – and this is the point we need apply to 
the critique of critical psychology - is the awareness that the utilization of discourse is 
not unaffected by psychical dynamics of desire and ambivalence. 5  
These concerns with the psychological/psychical dimension of racism mirrors 
those of Lane (1998), Shepherdson (1998), Žižek (1998) all of whom argue that 
discursive/ideological approaches appear unable to properly explain certain of 
racism’s most vital characteristics: its affective charge, its libidinal currents, the 
racist’s formidable investment in their own racial hatred, the racist’s pleasure-in-
hating. Indeed, failing to engage the personalized affectivity of racism, the 
individualized psychical mechanics that underscore its discursive functioning leaves 
us curiously unable to account for the persistence of racism, its pronounced 
irrationality, its compulsive qualities, the visceral quality of its hatred, its continuous, 
seemingly repetitive nature. To speak in more grounded terms: we need strong 
psychological accounts of racism if racism is to be adequately examined, confronted 
and hence contested. The question that we need confront certain trends within critical 
psychology with is whether racism as a psychological or psychical phenomena has 
not been able to slip from their grasp, ironically enough, because critical psychology 
has not permitted itself access enough to, reasonable enough purchase upon, the 
conceptual domain of the psychological. Indeed, by neglecting the 
psychological/psychical as a critical means of explanation and/or critique, critical 
psychology seems to have undermined its own critical efficacy regards the 
phenomena of racism.  Oddly, the focus on the turn to text that has proved so central 
to its efforts in the last decade might represent its most pronounced critical limitation, 
especially so if these efforts have become largely limited to the discursive as its 
conceptual and methodological analytical mode of choice, to conceiving of racism as 
an issue of representation, rhetorical strategy, significatory practice, etc. 
It is again necessary here to qualify the terms of my argument, for, indeed, the 
early turn to discourse on the part of some critical psychologists was undertaken in 
conjunction with an interest in psychoanalytic concepts. The interest in subjectivity 
and desire is outlined in the landmark Changing the Subject (Henriques et al, 1984), 
which, in this respect can be contrasted with another influential work from the same 
period, Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology. The tension 
between psychoanalytic and discursive approaches has in certain instances fuelled 
debate in the field. Hollway & Jefferson, for example, have focused on utilizing 
certain psychoanalytic concepts to the task of critical social research (2000) (although 
one frequently has the suspicion that this is a somewhat domesticated version of 
psychoanalysis). The work of Parker is likewise pertinent; an engagement with 
psychoanalysis has consistently featured in his key works on critical psychology 
(1997, 2002); indeed he has treated it as a fundamental resource for the practice of 
critical psychology (1999). As true as this is, one might nevertheless contend that 
psychoanalytic modes of analysis are, often, as is to my mind the case in the above 
examples, accommodated only through a discursive frame, provisionally engaged, as 
one might put it, through the filter of social constructionism. I should, furthermore, be 
more specific here. My concerns are not simply to signal a greater need for 
rapprochement between discursive and psychoanalytic strands of critical psychology. 
This would be in many ways a redundant objective (although one might remark that 
psychoanalytic conceptualizations need not continually be restrained through an over-
arching adherence to post-structural theory). Likewise, my objective is not simply to 
comment on discursive approaches to racism. My objective, in a more general way, is 
to call attention to the need to utilize psychological modes of critique and 
conceptualization (psychoanalysis included, but by no means exclusively) toward the 
political and emancipatory objectives of critical psychology.  
I might refocus the argument in the following way: we need beware the 
shortcomings of the conflation of ‘the critical’ with ‘the discursive’, which is perhaps 
also the difference between a critical psychology preoccupied with an external 
scrutiny of psychology, seeking to focus its critical energies on problematizing the 
place of psychological explanations in patterns of power and ideology (Parker, 2002), 
and the objectives of a critical liberation psychology, which, to quote Foster 
 
involves questions of the psychological processes, dynamics, capacities and practices 
through which people may achieve emancipation, freedom, liberation and escape from 
particular power structures of oppression and exploitation. (2004, p. 541) 
 
This distinction is exasperated in the context of developing societies like that of 
Southern Africa, where, as Van Vlaenderen and Neves (2004a) argue 
 
critical psychology needs to move beyond the applied level of ideological critique to 
consider ways of refashioning itself so as to serve an emancipatory and socially 
transformative agenda that is properly responsive to the demands of…society. (p. 445)  
 
Perhaps the crucial point here – which the comparison with postcolonial forms of 
criticism helps make very clear – is that critical psychology should be concerned both 
with critiquing oppressive uses of psychology and with enabling potentially 
transformative forms of practice and/or analysis that disrupt imbalances of power 
toward the objective of social equality. It is with this focus on the liberatory or 
emancipatory potential of psychology in the African context, that we now turn to the 
writings of Steve Biko. 
 
 
Biko, Black Consciousness 
 
Biko provides another way of operationalizing a politics of the psyche, of drawing 
elements of a psychological vocabulary into a set of political agendas. As mentioned 
above, Biko exemplifies that line of psychopolitics that utilizes the terms of 
psychological experience as means of consolidating resistances to power, and in this 
respect he notably extends Fanon. As is the case with Fanon, and as bears repetition, 
the crucial psychopolitical component of Biko’s writings - in particular Black 
Consciousness’s emphasis on a psychological politics of resistance - seems 
surprisingly undervalued in critical psychology. Biko’s is a turning ‘inside out’ of the 
psychological into the political, and an ‘outside in’ of the political into the domain of 
psychological experience.  
 A few words of introduction are important here. There are elements of Biko’s 
writing which may appear unfashionable today, his reference to seemingly static and 
idealized notions of an African culture seemingly lost and past, for example, or the 
apparent essentializing bent of an identity politics which may seem rigid, 
unaccommodating of dissent or internal difference, unable to adequately 
accommodate nuances of cultural hybridity, and so on. Against the tendency to 
dismiss Biko’s writings as of pertinence only to their specific time and place, I argue 
for their continued vitality. More than this, I would argue that the consigning of 
Biko’s writing to a discrete time and place of relevance is to do an injustice to both 
writer and ideas. There seems to me an imperative to re-read Biko, perhaps in view of 
Said’s (1993) suggestion of contrapuntal reading, as way of evaluating the text in and 
out of its history, and putting it to work against a new set of political priorities. 
Biko’s view of Black Consciousness 6 called for the psychological and cultural 
liberation of the black mind as the prerequisite for political freedom – in his own 
words: ‘mental emancipation as a precondition to political emancipation’ (Biko, cited 
in Arnold, 1972, p. xx). What is in question here is exactly ‘the psychological battle 
for the minds of the black people’ (Arnold, 1979, xxi). The context to this political 
project was 300 years of colonial rule, which had ‘disfigured’ the African past, and all 
but destroyed black ‘imagination’ (Biko, 1978). The mutilation of the black psyche, 
and, correspondingly, the systematic marginalization of those cultural resources 
through which it had traditionally attained autonomy and vitality, had been extreme. 
As such, the challenge of BC was to reverse the colonial imprint of a negative, racist 
self-image, and to replace it with a positive, more self-affirming – if not angry - forms 
of black identity and history. Importantly, ‘blackness’ here – and this is crucial point, 
particularly against contentions of essentialism - was not simply an issue of skin 
color, but was a form of solidarity, a collective form of hope and security, a way for 
black people to ‘build up their humanity’ (Biko, cited in Arnold, 1979 p. 34).  
Emphatically then, we are not speaking here of a unified psychology of black 
essences, but a psychology based on disruptive historical experiences of oppression 
and marginality. This is reflected in Biko’s definition of blacks as ‘those who are by 
law or tradition politically, economically, and socially discriminated against as a 
group in South African society, and [who] identify themselves as a unit in the struggle 
towards the realization of their aspirations’ (1998, p. 360).  In opposition to self-
negating ways of thinking thus, Biko called for solidarity amongst those that apartheid 
labeled ‘non-white’, emphasizing the need for oppressed groups to identify with 
themselves and to advance the liberation struggle on this basis. ‘Blackness’ as a kind 
of politics was hence, as Arnold (1979) argues, a deliberate attempt to lay the 
intellectual and emotive base for ultimate political unity between Apartheid’s others. 
It is on this basis that Biko (1978) took up the mandate to emphasize the role of a 
healthy subjectivity, of a robust, proud and positive self-image, as a means of 
empowering one’s self to resist oppression.  
 Importantly then, we need to read Biko’s Black Consciousness as a politics of 
solidarity, which celebrates blackness and concomitant notions of identity and culture 
around this political objective, of liberation, not simply as ends in themselves. 7  Two 
points of historical contextualization are pertinent here. We need bear in mind, firstly, 
that apartheid’s success was in many ways due to its divide-and-conquer approach 
which systematically cultivated in-group violence (often on ethnic lines) among the 
black populous, preventing - as an absolute strategic imperative - the forging of any 
over-arching unity, class (or here, race) consciousness, any form of solidarity among 
the oppressed masses, who, as is well known, vastly outnumbered the white minority 
(Lapping, 1987). Hence Black Consciousness’s prioritization of a robust and unifying 
group identity of resistance. Secondly, we need keep sight of the extreme racism 
characteristic of apartheid, a system not merely of 
depersonalization/desubjectivization, but of violent racial objectification and 
dehumanization.  
This radical depersonalization is an important point to bear in mind, especially 
against those forms of critique, such as that made by Butchart (1997) (following 
Foucault), that Black Consciousness might itself be classified as a self-subjectivizing 
system that manufactured ‘a new and essentialist African personality…wherein each 
African was his own overseer, exercising surveillance over and against himself’ (p. 
104). Despite that Black Consciousness need not necessarily be essentialist (the basis 
for solidarity is a communality of oppression, not, as in negritude, that of an African 
essence), one also needs bear in mind here that Foucault’s (1977) critique of self-
subjectivizing modes of power occurs within the context of liberal, democratic 
Western societies, and in reference to individualized, personalized subjects, who 
constitute a very different set of referents to the dehumanized racial ‘objects’ of black 
men and women in apartheid. In terms of the latter, subjectification is itself a 
progressive political, and properly liberatory aim, particularly so if it entails a 
definition and programme of identity focused in deliberate opposition to the practices, 
values, norms and ideology of the state. 
Biko’s attempts to raise to the level of humanity of the racially objectified black 
subject should not as such be taken as a kind of bland moral humanism. Rather such 
attempts need to be understood as part of the attempt to respond to a level of utter 
depersonalization and objectification - perhaps difficult to understand by those who 
have never experienced such a radical disempowerment – that is, as part of a political 
project that acknowledges the degree to which negative forms of identity can be 
central features of oppression. Biko explains this well in his declaration that 
 
Reduced to an obliging shell [the black subject]…looks with awe at the white power 
structure and accepts what he [sic] regards as the ‘inevitable position’…The black man 
has become a shadow, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave and 
ox, bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity. (Biko, cited in Lapping, 
1984, p. 158) 
 
Crucial again here is an awareness of the double direction of racism, of the fact that 
racism may be sourced, as Fanon (1986) had argued, both inside and outside the racial 
subject. The point here is that the internalization of self-depreciating identities is a key 
political tactic of oppression. Hence Biko’s remark that ‘the most potent weapon in 
the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ (in Arnold, 1979, p. xx). This 
of course is a remark that also emphasizes the role, and the potential, of identity in 
political resistance. 
A key strategy of Black Consciousness was conscientization. Conscientization, 
as was the case for Paulo Freire (1990), involves what Biko referred to as protest talk, 
talk about circumstances of oppression that links the everyday conditions of 
experience to a set of political antecedents. Here then the turning inside out of the 
psychological into the political, and an ‘outside in’ of the political into psychological 
experience, as mentioned above. Conscientization involved the repeated attempt to 
 
make reference to the conditions of the Black man [sic] and the conditions in which the 
Black man lives. We try to get Blacks in conscientization to grapple realistically with 
their problems…to develop what one might call an awareness, a physical awareness of 
their situation…to be able to analyze it, and to provide answers for themselves. (Biko, 
in Arnold, 1979, p.33)  
 
Like Fanon’s, Biko’s was a political project which involved a profound cultural 
awareness. Indeed, the consciousness-raising of Black Consciousness also involves a 
component of historical redress:  
 
Black Consciousness [has]…to do with correcting false images of ourselves in terms of 
culture, education, religion, and economics…There is always an interplay between the 
history of a people…the past, and their faith in themselves and hopes for their future. 
We are aware of the terrible role played by our education and religion in creating 
amongst us a false understanding of ourselves. (Biko, 1998, p. 363) 
 
This process of ‘correcting false images’ must be undertaken by black men and 
women themselves ‘Whites…from the outside…can never extract and analyze the 
ethos in the black community’ (Biko, 1978, p. 363). This should not be taken as 
representing a segregationist viewpoint, rather Biko’s (1998) concern is that blacks 
should not always be interpreted by whites. 8 
Black Consciousness then, to reiterate, emerges out of a twofold objective: an 
awareness of the imperative of generating political solidarity amongst the oppressed, 
and the need to disrupt and halt the massive and systematic depersonalization of so-
called ‘non-whites’ in apartheid. Each of these objectives finds their place within the 
larger political goal of black liberation and independence from oppression, the over-
riding importance of which Biko is quick to stress: 
 
One must immediately dispel the thought that Black Consciousness is merely a 
methodology or a means to an end. What Black Consciousness seeks to do is to 
produce at the output end of the process real black people who do not regards 
themselves as appendages to white society…it will always be a lie to accept white 
values as necessarily the best. (1978, p. 362) 
 
Biko hence utilizes the trope of the psychological as a strategic and, importantly, 
conditional mode of doing politics, without ultimately, like Fanon, allowing it too 
much of its own autonomy. To be clear: by the ‘trope’ of the psychological I mean to 
refer both to psychology’s array of explanatory concepts, and to its characteristic 
preoccupation of reflection on lived experience and identity. This is a utilization - 
consistent in certain ways with how Fanon and Bhabha press the domain of the 
psychological into kinds of political work - that itself poses a series of interesting 
questions: What is it about such psychological formulations which makes them so 
efficacious in the writing of critique? What are the particular properties that the 
language of psychology potentially lends to a discourse of dissent, to the project of 
practicing, indeed, experiencing, resistance?  
It is of course essential here that we resist codifying Biko’s politics into 
exclusively psychological terms of explanation. (Much of the same problem arises in 
connection with Fanon’s use of the notion of alienation, which in its 
economic/materialist/Marxist resonances cannot be reduced simply into a 
psychological kind of understanding (see Bulhan, 1985; Zahar, 1969). Indeed, as 
Mnguni (2000) points out, the body of literature on Black Consciousness should not 
be seen as for the most chiefly psychologically orientated; it utilizes a spread of 
historical, cultural and even theological revitalizations of black identity. Kros (1999) 
is helpful here. The rehabilitation of identity and history that Black Conscious aims at 
is not, she (1999) argues, to be understood as an individualized exercise in positive 
thinking, a building of self-esteem. The determination of the black man or woman to 
rise and attain the envisaged self is clearly not to be reduced to a kind of self-help 
psychology (Kros, 1999). The point is exactly to connect psychological kinds of 
conceptualization and modes of reflection to a far larger political projects, not to keep 
the two spheres separate, hence the notion of the psycho-political, the idea of political 
consciousness. To reiterate: the drive to overcome political oppression through 
collective effort is not simply a psychological ‘formula of identity’ (Kros, 1999) - the 
project here is exactly that of political identity: the use of identity as a kind of weapon, 
as political instrument. The psychological means of articulating this envisaged self are 
hence useful precisely inasmuch as they further this end, and not beyond. 
Biko’s writing provides an invaluable perspective on the potential critical and 
political utilization of a discourse of the psychological. One of the lessons we can take 
from Biko is that of the importance and the means, of thinking a psychology of 
dissidence and resistance, indeed, of applying our conceptual efforts within 
psychology toward these ends. In fact, his work gives rise to a number of questions 
concerning the political utility of the psychological. Why the continued return to a 
language of psychology (as in Fanon, Bhabha and Biko) to formulate resistance? 
What is it about this conceptual domain that makes it so crucial a vocabulary of 
opposition? Here then is a prospective question for a future critical psychology more 
willing to engage the political value of psychological conceptualizations. 
Perhaps more trenchantly however, Biko’s work demonstrates a commitment 
to resistance – indeed, it is true to say that Biko’s writings begin and end with this 
overarching objective – a political centring that many social scientific and 
psychological types of discourse, critical psychology included, would find unfamiliar. 
Biko’s writing, like that of Fanon, hence offers a set of ‘social psychological’ 
theorizations that cannot be viewed apart from designs of social action. Indeed, this 
work came into being exactly in response to immediate contexts of oppression, a 
factor that means they do not exhibit the gap - seemingly characteristic of critical 
psychology - between intellectual analysis and practical political engagement. This 
consideration makes the absence of Fanon and Biko from critical psychology, a 
‘heterogeneous process of critique’ eager to align itself with political activity, more 
puzzling still. Indeed, it is via a comparison with the writings of Biko and Fanon that 
one gets a sense of exactly how far from an actual politics of social change the efforts 
of particularly discursive varieties of critical psychology in fact are. (Again here it is 
important to draw a distinction between discursive, constructionist modes of critical 
psychology (such as that of Hepburn, 2003; Parker, 2002; Walkerdine, 2002) as 
opposed to more practically-orientated liberatory approaches to critical psychology 
who, in line with the above, take as a priority the development of a critical 
psychology of social change (for example, see Banuazizi, 1996; Lykes, 2002, 2003; 
Prilleltensky, 2001; Prilleltensky & Austin, 2001; Van Vlaenderen & Neves, 2004a, 
2004b). 
In commenting on the legacy of anti-colonial writings such as those of Fanon 
and Biko, Gibson notes that  
 
What remains a philosophical project is how one begins to articulate the meaning of 
mass action, expand the new social consciousness derived from the cultures of 
resistance and solidarity into new directions. (1999, p. 38).  
 
Can discursive, constructionist varieties of critical psychology realistically lay claim 
to any of these objectives, of expanding social consciousness, developing cultures of 
solidarity or resistance, of thinking the role and meaning of mass action?  
 
 
Critical psychology and the postcolonial: Future intersections 
 
In drawing to a close it seems apt to return to Hayes (2001), and his suggestion that 
the current imperative for critical psychology is that of engaging with, and developing, 
a set of concepts with the ability to transcend abstract forms of analysis and point the 
way to practical political engagement, because ‘critical psychology would 
be...incomplete if it did not try to take on the injustices and inequalities of the world’ 
(p. 47).  Concurring with Hayes, I have argued above that the contemporary turn to 
discourse in critical psychology has played a significant role in negating the 
psychological realm as a domain of resistance and critique. I have suggested that 
postcolonial thought offers a set of concepts through which we might transcend the 
discursive register of much critical psychology. In the case of Fanon and Biko one has 
a set of examples of how postcolonial criticism offers a way of closing the gap 
between intellectual and political activity, between insular critique and the impetus to 
broader social action. Both, furthermore, provide an impetus toward a psychology of 
resistance, a psychological means of thinking the effects of marginalization, 
discrimination, alterity, which moves beyond an accentuation of psychic damage, 
beyond a ‘rhetorics of blame’, to use Said’s (1993) phrase, towards a strategic 
consolidation of ‘psychopolitical’ resources, be those communal (a solidarity of the 
oppressed) or personal (a politics of everyday experience).  
One way of bringing together the ‘critical psychologies’ of postcolonial critics 
such as Fanon, Biko and Bhabha is via the notion of the psychopolitical. Here I have 
in mind a reciprocal form of critique in which we not only place the psychological 
within the register of the political, but, perhaps more challengingly, in which the 
political is also - although strategically - approached through the register of the 
psychological. What the writings of Fanon and Biko make plain in this connection is 
the degree to which the narratives and concepts of the social psychological may be 
reformulated so as to fashion a novel discourse of resistance, one that opens up new 
avenues for critique for critical psychology, on one hand, and one that affords an 
innovative set of opportunities for the psychological investigation of the vicissitudes 
of the postcolonial, on the other.  
If Fanon could be said to have a ‘lesson’ for critical psychology it may well be 
the lesson that psychology itself should not be abandoned as a means of 
conceptualizing oppression, especially not in the case of confronting racism, a 
phenomena that seems as psychical as it does political in nature. As Fanon’s 
psychiatric work testifies, the micro-political level of individual psychology cannot 
simply be ignored in projects of liberation. Fanon also (here perhaps in tandem with 
Bhabha) has a lesson for a critical psychology that would ignore the psychical 
dimensions power (as in the emblematic case of racism), for those theories which rely 
too heavily on the ‘discursivity’ of power without engaging the psychic terrain, the 
complexities of desire, ambivalence, identification and sexuality that play their part in 
such formations of power. Biko has a lesson for a critical psychology that would 
abandon psychology as a means of thinking resistance, as an instrumental language in 
motivating the resistance talk of conscientization. He likewise has a lesson for those 
forms of psychology which would attempt to think dissidence and resistance, but who 
have neglected the instrumentality of identity. (The ‘instrumentality of identity’ that is 
not in the essentialist capacity, but rather as a psychology based on historical 
experiences of oppression and marginality). 
 While this paper has focused largely on aspects of the history of race relations 
between and within Europe and Africa (and South Africa), the modes of critique and 
conceptualization called upon here may of course inform how one understands the 
politics of alterity in a variety of other domains. I should emphasize this point: 
postcolonial criticism offers a new and expanding field of concepts which may be 
used as tools by psychologists attempting politically-engaged psychology in their own 
local spheres. The imperative this paper points to is that of exploring a set of 
intersections between critical psychological and postcolonial concerns. Such a set of 
interactions would develop far beyond the tentative outline offered here, and may 
indeed provide the basis of an ongoing and developing project that propels the 
prospects of thinking and writing a psychology of resistance. Let me give one 
(further) speculative example before closing, the case of what one might guardedly 
refer to as Bhabha’s ‘psychology’ of doubling.  
In describing the effects of Bhabha’s criticism one is tempted to use a visual 
metaphor - his criticism is like the conceptual equivalent of looking into a 
kaleidoscope: it splits, doubles, fragments the objects in the view of his analysis, 
complexifying the terrain, continually producing fissures of ambiguity and hence 
resistance. One of Bhabha’s assets as a thinker would seem to be the purchase he 
gives us on the notion of resistance, even if it is (characteristically) ambiguously 
formulated in his work, in for example, the subversions of what he calls ‘sly civility’, 
the slippages of colonial mimicry, the doubling of the hybrid. This is the continual 
strategy of his writing. As opposed to Edward Said whose earlier work spends much 
of its time impressing upon us the awesome discursive power of what he calls 
orientalism, Bhabha endeavors to read the internal insecurities and doubts within the 
patterns and operations of colonial discourses and apparatuses of power alike. He is 
continually attentive to how such implementations of power open up opportunities for 
their own subversion (Campbell, 2000). So, to give an example, whereas Fanon 
focuses a good deal of attention on the colonized, famously asking, via Freud, ‘what 
does the black man want?’, Bhabha seems concerned with balancing this attention on 
the oppressed with an attention to the desire of the colonizer, with implicitly asking 
‘what does the white man want?’. One of the places that this line of concern takes him 
– as part of the attempt to think the ambivalence of colonial authority and identity – is 
to a querying of the narcissistic demand of the colonial forces of oppression. If 
narcissistic demand is a workable concept here – bearing in mind Bhabha’s apparent 
slippage between social and individual registers, narcissistic demand here, 
furthermore, being employed as a basic condition of social apparatuses of power – 
then it may lead us to a potential ‘Achilles heel’ of this order of power. We might, in 
other words, be able to menace the procedures of this power, exploit the paranoia of 
its mechanisms by refusing its narcissistic demands of self-affirmation. This may be 
the subtle difference between a subservient obedience and a sly civility opened up by 
the moment of colonial mimicry whose function is never to harmonize or compliment, 
but instead, to camouflage, never simply to reaffirm or reiterate, but to repeat with 
difference and anxiety.  
In short, Bhabha enables a theory, routed through psychoanalysis, of how 
power may be troubled, of how anxieties may be produced within it, through the 
vehicle of troublesome objects and events which defy easy categorization exactly by 
following too strictly the colonial injunction to be the same but not quite, or in 
Bhabha’s own memorable phrase, ‘almost the same but not white’ (1994, p. 89). I 
offer these comments in a speculative and experimental way; clearly an attempt to 
adequately apply Bhabha’s often complex formulations within the remit of critical 
psychology would require a far more sustained and analytical engagement with his 
work. My point is simply to suggest that there may be any number of ways in which 
we might further the intersections of postcolonial criticism and critical psychology. 
Furthermore, this example points to the fact that the concept of a psychopolitical 
psychology might be used to ‘decolonize the mind’ in a way that does not necessarily 
reflect the ‘precolonized’ state of mind, but that rather allows us to understand the 
creation of a third, incommensurable, hybrid space. The psychology of resistance thus 
enabled would not necessarily hence be one a pristine, pure or decolonized state of 
mind, but would refer rather to an assertion of presence – or voice – that had been 
previously muted and not given the space in which to speak. 9  In this respect we find 
a convergence of theorization on behalf of a variety of postcolonial theorists who 
focus on the necessity of creating the cultural, historical and material conditions under 
which the subaltern can come forward and speak for him or herself (in this respect, 
see Guha, 1988; Guha & Spivak, 1988; Prakash, 1990, 1992; Said, 1993; Spivak, 
1988, 1996). A whole new vista of speculative possibilities thus for the theorization of 
resistance. 
To finish, a return to Bhabha. If it is indeed the case that, as he (1994) puts it, 
it is on the basis of the affective experience of social/political marginality that we are 
able to transform and renew our critical strategies, if, furthermore, it is from those 
who have suffered subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement that we learn our 
most enduring critical lessons, then a critical psychology that makes no real 
engagement with the theory or criticism of the postcolonial would seem to be no 
critical psychology at all. 
 
Notes 
1. Fanon and Biko of course are more accurately referred to as ‘anti-colonial’ thinkers in 
as much as they are working prior to the formal demise of colonial or apartheid 
regimes of oppression. While it is true that anti-colonial texts of this sort tend to be 
more focussed on the immediate concerns of liberation than are postcolonial critcisms 
whose ambit is more that of the cultural and political import of the ongoing historical 
effects of colonisation (Said’s work (1978, 1993) is a good case in point), both 
literatures clearly share fundamental commitments to concerns of racism, marginality, 
cultural dispossession and the politics of racial and cultural identity. I have opted here 
to retain the more generic and encompassing term of ‘postcolonial’, as is typically the 
convention, because I wish to refer to a broad sway of criticism and theory that has 
yet to find its way into psychological discourse. 
2. This no doubt this is a bold claim, for crucial texts the likes of Césaire’s (1972) 
Discourse on Colonialism were in existence: I refer here to the particular, hybrid 
nature of Fanon’s critique, the innovative bending of existential, psychoanalytic, 
Marxist and psychiatric modes of commentary into a unique critical vocabulary. 
3. Fanon’s sociogenetic approach to psychopathology also finds its place here, 
particularly his insistence, via the idea of ‘pathologies of liberty’, that a wide range of 
psychopathological symptoms in oppressed/colonized groups needs be seen as the 
outcome of a double process, primarily socio-political, and only subsequently, as 
internalised form of damage. In colonial contexts, he claims: ‘The neurotic structure 
of the individual is simply the elaboration, the formation, the eruption within the ego, 
of conflictual clusters arising in part out of the environment and in part out of the 
purely personal way in which the individual reacts to these influences’ (1986, p. 81). 
4. This point resonates strongly with Edward Said’s (1983) notion of ‘secular criticism’, 
namely the idea that disciplinary purism - and its concomitant preoccupation with a 
precise, insular technical vocabulary – precisely prevents a political mode of criticism, 
functioning, by contrast, to effectively foreclose the asking of certain political 
questions, the making of important political links. The project of secular criticism 
hence should make texts (in Said’s domain of literary criticism), or, more pertinently 
perhaps psyches (in the domain of Fanon’s concerns in Black Skin, White Masks), 
reassume their ‘affiliations with institutions, agencies, classes, ideologically defined 
parties’ (Said, 1983, p. 212). 
5. To remain unaware of this fact means that one’s model of colonial discourse becomes 
strangely static, lacking in flexibility, monolithic even, too rigidly structured along 
the master-slave dialectic. Indeed, there are a number of densely inter-woven 
problems for Bhabha that deserve more extended treatment. Briefly, a model of 
colonial discourse that does not adequately grapple with psychical dynamics 1) 
allows for insufficient engagement with the details of enunciation (that is, the 
specificity of the location and address of exchange), 2) too easily assumes a single 
over-riding political intention on the part of the colonizer, 3) fixes the relationship 
between discourse and politics into a deterministic or functionalist model, 4) pays too 
little attention to the theorization of resistance or interference (to the possibility of 
what Bhabha (1994) refers to as the ‘disarticulation’ of the colonial subject) (Childs 
& Williams, 1997; Moore-Gilbert, 1997; Young, 1990).  
6. Black Consciousness, even in the South African context that I focus on here, is 
clearly not reducible to Biko alone, as the writings of Manganyi (1973, 1977, 1981), 
Fatton (1986), and more recently, Mnguni (2000), make clear. (See also Couve, 1984; 
Mzamane 1991; Nengwekhulu, 1981; Sono, 1993).  
7. It makes for interesting speculation here, to consider, as part of a potential 
psychology of resistance, that a politics of solidarity may well be based on a shifting 
set of co-ordinates, which, perhaps like Spivak’s ‘strategic essentialism’ may appear 
essentialist in nature but in fact are not, although they constitute a critical mass of 
sorts for political action. 
8. It is easy here, as Kros (1999) notes, to soften Biko’s radicalism on this point. Indeed, 
Biko rejected the idea that blacks should in any way be assimilated into ‘white 
society’, and on this basis that he argued that whiteness was a concept that ‘warrants 
being despised, hated, destroyed and replaced by an aspiration with more human 
content in it’ (Biko, 1978, p. 77). In Kros’s own terms: ‘‘whiteness’, no less than 
‘blackness’ [for Biko] was a historically constituted identity with profoundly limiting 
ramifications for those who found themselves defined by it. It was not to be 
shed…simply by an act of goodwill precisely because it was so bound up with long 
historical processes and entrenched material interests’ (1999, p. 7). 
9. I owe this point to Sunil Bhatia. 
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